Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 59

Issue 2

Article 8

2009

The Famous Marks Exception to the Territoriality Principle in
American Trademark Law
James Faris

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
James Faris, The Famous Marks Exception to the Territoriality Principle in American Trademark Law, 59
Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 451 (2009)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol59/iss2/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an
authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

NOTES

THE FAMOUS MARKS EXCEPTION TO
THE TERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE IN
AMERICAN TRADEMARK LAWI
INTRODUCTION

Over the course of thirty years of continuous operation, a
restaurant named "Bukhara" in New Delhi, India, develops a
reputation as one of the world's finest restaurants.2 The restaurant
becomes famous throughout much of the world, and the restaurant's
owners decide to open several additional Bukhara restaurants outside
of India. 3 Meanwhile, five individuals in New York, familiar with the
famous Bukhara restaurant in New Delhi, decide to open an Indian
restaurant in New York called "Bukhara Grill."4 The New York
I

Courts and commentators often refer interchangeably to the "famous marks" doctrine

and the "well-known marks" doctrine. 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS

& UNFAIR COMPETITION §29:61 (4th ed. 2007); see, e.g., ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc. (ITC II),
482 F.3d 135, 156 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 288 (2007); Empresa Cubana Del
Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 213 F. Supp. 2d 247, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). In the United States, the
term "famous marks" has at least two different legal connotations. 5 MCCARTHY, supra, §
29:61. This Note discusses the famous marks doctrine as the legal concept by which the owner
of a trademark can protect his mark within a particular nation if the mark is sufficiently well
known in that nation, even if the owner has not actually used or registered the mark in that
nation. Id The status of a mark as a "famous mark" is also relevant in the context of state and
federal anti-dilution statutes. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006). This Note will not discuss
"famous marks" in the context of dilution.
2 Hypothetical based on ITC II, 482 F.3d 135; see ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc. (ITC III),
880 N.E.2d 852, 854 (N.Y. 2007) (stating that the London-based "Restaurant" magazine named
ITC's Bukhara restaurant as one of the fifty best restaurants in the world), acq. in answer to
certyiled question 518 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2008).
3 SeeITCII,482F.3dat 143.
4 Id. at 144.
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restaurateurs, in addition to choosing a similar name for their
restaurant, also replicate the New Delhi restaurant's logos, d6cor,
staff uniforms, menus, and red-checkered bibs.5 The owners of the
New York Bukhara Grill admit they chose their restaurant's name, at
least in part, due to the recognition of the "Bukchara" mark among the
relevant population in New York familiar with the New Delhi
restaurant.6 The owners of the New Delhi Bukhara restaurant do not
operate any restaurants in the United States, and they do not currently
have the Bukhara mark registered with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office ("USPTO").7 Can the owners of the New Delhi
Bukhara restaurant assert any substantive rights in U.S. courts to
enjoin the owners of the New York Bukhara Grill from infringing its
famous trademark?
Under Article 6bis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property (the "Paris Convention") and Article 16(2) of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
("TRIPS"), international treaties to which the United States is a
signatory, the "famous marks" doctrine might preclude the New York
restaurateurs' use of the Bukhara mark in the situation described
above.8 Under the famous marks doctrine, "[ilf a mark used only on
products or services sold abroad is so famous that its reputation is
known in the United States, then that mark should be legally
recognized in the United States." 9 But a majority of U.S. courts have
held that the Paris Convention is not self-executing and cannot form
the basis of a claim in federal court absent federal legislation giving
effect to its articles.'0 Congress codified federal trademark law with
the Lanham Act in 1946,11 and the Ninth Circuit and the Second

6

5Id.
Id

7

Id

8See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]; Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, revised on July 14, 1967,
21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
95 McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 29:4.
10 See Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co. (Grupo HI), 391 F.3d 1088, 1099-100
(9th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he Paris Convention creates neither a federal cause of action nor additional
substantive rights.
.. ); Int'l Cafd, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Cafd Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d
1274, 1277 n.5 (I11th Cir. 200 1) ("The Paris Convention is not self-executing because, on its
face, the Convention provides that it will become effective only through domestic legislation.");
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleumn Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979) (finding that the
Paris Convention is not self-executing and requires domestic legislation for inmplementation).
But see Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 640 (2d Cir. 1956) (observing in
dictum that, upon ratification by Congress, the Paris Convention required "no special legislation
in the United States .. , to make [it] effective here"); 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 29:33.
11See Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at
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Circuit are currently split as to whether the Lanham Act recognizes
2
the famous marks doctrine.'1
One important reason why Congress might have chosen not to
incorporate the famous marks doctrine into the Lanham Act is that the
doctrine runs contrary to the territoriality principle of American
trademark law.'13 The territoriality principle, which is basic to U.S.
trademark law,14 provides that, "a trademark is recognized as having a
separate existence in each sovereign territory in which it is registered
or legally recognized as a mark."' 5 As such, "ownership of a mark in
one country does not automatically confer upon the owner the
exclusive right to use that mark in another country."' Therefore, if
federal trademark law recognizes the famous marks doctrine, it does
so as an exception to the territorial nature of a trademark.
This Note addresses the dichotomy between the famous marks
doctrine and the territoriality principle in U.S. trademark law. Part I
describes the legal background of trademarks, the territoriality
principle, and the famous marks doctrine. Part I also discusses the
relationship between the Paris Convention, TRIPS, and the Lanham
Act. Part 11 examines the decisions of courts in the United States that
have addressed the famous marks doctrine, including the current split
between the Ninth Circuit and the Second Circuit in their treatment of
the famous marks doctrine under the Lanham Act. Part III discusses
the need for a famous marks exception to the territoriality principle.
Part III also considers various standards for determining whether a
mark would qualify as famous under the famous marks doctrine and
argues that a variation of the Ninth Circuit's "secondary meaning
plus" is the appropriate standard. The secondary meaning plus
standard would best balance the aims of the territoriality principle
with the need to prevent consumer confusion and ensure compliance
with international treaty obligations.

15 U.S.C. §§ 105 1-1 141 (2006)).
12 Compare Grupo 11, 391 F.3d 1088 (recognizing the famous marks doctrine under the
Lanham Act), with ITC HI, 482 F.3d 135 (declining to recognize the famous marks doctrine
under the Lanham Act absent action by Congress).
13 See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §29: 1.
14 See ITC HI, 482 F.3d at 155 ("The principle of territoriality is basic to American
trademark law."); Am. Circuit Breaker Corp. v. Or. Breakers, Inc., 406 F.3d 577, 581 (9th Cir.
2005) ("It is now generally agreed and understood that trademark protection encompasses the
notion of territoriality."); Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 714 (3d Cir. 2004)
(stating that territoriality is basic to trademark law); Person's Co. v. Christnm, 900 F.2d 1565,
1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("The concept of territoriality is basic to trademark law; trademark
rights exist in each country solely according to that country's statutory scheme.").
15 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §29: 1.
16 ITC HI, 482 F.3d at 155.
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1. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE TERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE AND THE
FAMOUS MARKS DOCTRINE

A trademark is "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof . . . used by a person . . . to identify and
distinguish his or her goods ... from those manufactured or sold by
others .... ~ The primary policy underlying the law of trademarks is
the interest in protecting the public from confusion and deceit.'"
A secondary policy justification for trademark law is the trademark
owner's interest in not having "the fruit of his labor
misappropriated."' 9 But a trademark owner's interest in protecting his
mark from misappropriation often runs contrary to the fundamental
policy of the law regulating the free market economy-that the public
benefits from the encouragement of free competition .2 0 As such,
exclusive rights in intellectual property, including trademarks, are the
exception to the general preference for free copying and imitation. 21
A. The Lanham Act
In the United States, trademark law developed as a derivative of
the common law tort of fraud and deceit during the nineteenth
century.2 Congress first attempted to pass federal legislation
providing for trademark registration in 1870,2 but the Supreme Court
held the legislation unconstitutional in violation of Congress's
Commerce Clause authority in 1879.2 Unlike copyrights and patents,
the Constitution does not grant Congress exclusive power to regulate
trademarks . 25 Therefore, Congress has power to regulate trademarks
17

15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).

18 1 MCCARTHY,

supra note 1, § 2: 1.

Id
20 Id.; see Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); see
also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1: 1.
21 See Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (discussing exceptions to the general rule for production that involves creation,
19

invention, or discovery); I MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1: 1; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § I crnt. a (1995) ("The freedom to engage in business and to compete for
the patronage of prospective customers is a fundamental premise of the free enterprise
system.").
22 1MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5:2; see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 141 (1989) ("The law of unfair competition has its roots in the common-law
tort of deceit: its general concern is with protecting consumers from confusion as to source.
W~hile that concern may result in the creation of 'quasi-property rights' in communmicative
symbols, the focus is on the protection of consumers, not the protection of producers as an
incentive to product innovation.").
23 See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 77-84, 16 Stat. 198, 210-12; see also 1
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §5:3.
24 See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
25 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cI. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power. ...[110 promote the

2009]

2009]
THE FAMOUS MJARKS EXCEPTION45

455

only under its Commerce Clause authority to "regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes."2
From 1879 to 1946, Congress passed a series of statutes and
amendments under its Commerce Clause authority directed at
regulating trademarks within the United States, but they were all
inadequate to handle the realities of commerce in a rapidly
industrializing nation.2 In response to these inadequacies, a
committee of the Patent Section of the American Bar Association
together with Congressman Fritz Lanham, chairman of the House
Patent Committee dealing with trademarks, introduced a new and
comprehensive federal trademark registration act.2 The Lanham
Trademark Act, which represents the codification of federal
trademark law, became law in 1946.2
B. The TerritorialityDoctrine
Under section 32(l)(a) of the Lanham Act, the owner of a mark
registered with the USPTO can bring a civil suit for trademark
infringement against a person who used the mark without the owner's
consent.3 Under section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act, the producer
of a product or service can sue a person who uses "any word, term,
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof .. ,. which ...is
likely to cause confusion. ...
as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval
of [the producer's] . . . services."3 Unlike an infringement claim
under section 32, a claim under section 43 is available for marks not
registered with the USPTO.3 But before a plaintiff can show that an
infringer's use of a mark is likely to cause confusion under section 43,
he must prove his own right to use that mark.3

Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries..
26 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
27 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5:3; see, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502;
Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724; Act of Mar. 19, 1920, ch. 104,41 Slat. 533.
28 See 1 McCARTHY, supranote 1, § 5:4.
29 See 15 U. S.C. §§ 1051-1141 (2006); see also I MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5:4.
3015 U.S.C. § 11I14(l)(a).

3Id § 1125(a)(1).
32 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) ("Section 43(a)

prohibits a broader range of practices than does § 32, which applies to registered marks, but it is
a common ground that § 43(a) protects qualifying unregistered trademarks. .. ) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
33~See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co.. 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) ("There is no
such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to an established business or
trade in connection with which the mark is employed. ... [Ilts function is simply to designate
the goods as the product of a particular trader and to protect his good will against the sale of
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Under federal trademark law, to prove his own right to use the
mark in the United States a plaintiff who has not registered his mark
with the USPTO must demonstrate prior use of the mark within the
United States.3 Courts refer to the requirement of prior use in the
United States as the "territoriality" doctrine.3 Under the territoriality
doctrine, "[p]riority of trademark rights in the United States depends
solely upon priority of use in the United States, not on priority of use
anywhere in the world.",36 This rule of territoriality is contrary to the
"universality" doctrine, which states that, "if a trademark [is] lawfully
affixed to merchandise in one country, the merchandise would carry
that mark lawfully wherever it went and could not be deemed an
infringer although transported to another country where the exclusive
right to the mark was held by someone other than the owner of the
merchandise."3 Courts have rejected the universality doctrine in the
United States.3

another's product as his; and it is not the subject of property except in connection with an
existing business."); ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc. (ITC 11), 482 F.3d 135, 154 (2d Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 288 (2007) ("Preliminary to [showing that an infringer's use is likely to cause
confusion], a plaintiff must demonstrate its own right to use the mark or dress in question.");
Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1193 (11Ith Cir. 2001) (declaring
that a plaintiff must show "that it had prior rights to the mark at issue" in order to prevail in a
section 43(a) claim).
34 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006); United Drug Co., 248 U.S. 90; Hanover Star Milling, Co.
v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); Buti v. Impressa
Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1998); Person's Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1568
(Fed. Cir. 1990); Alntacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Market, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 326
(S.D.N.Y 2005) ("It has long been a bedrock principle of federal trademark law that registration
or prior use of a mark in the United States is a precondition to maintaining a cause of action for
infringement of the mark and the like.").
35 5 MCCARTffY, supra note 1, § 29: 1.
36 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 29:2 (footnotes omitted).
37 Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp 1163,1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
38 See, e.g., Am. Circuit Breaker Corp. v. Or. Breakers Inc., 406 F.3d 577, 581 (9th Cir.
2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §24 cmt. f (1995) ("The premise of the
universality principle that trademarks necessarily identify' the original manufacturer has been
rejected in [U.S.] domestic law.").
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The territoriality principle "is basic to American trademark law."3 9
Thus, for an owner of a mark in another country to ensure that U.S.
trademark law will recognize his rights to the mark in the United
States, he must use that mark in the United States .40 But under the
territoriality principle, if a foreign mark holder has not used his mark
in the United States before someone else, he will not be able to assert
priority rights under federal law-"even if a United States competitor
has knowingly appropriated that mark for his own use."'" For the
most part, the territoriality principle is the rule among foreign nations
as well .4 Article 6(3) of the Paris Convention provides that "[a] mark
duly registered in a country of the [Paris] Union shall be regarded as
independent of marks registered in other countries of the Union,
including the country of origin."' Thus, each country's mark is
independent of another's. Courts have viewed the United States'
adherence to the Paris Convention as committing to U.S. law the
territoriality doctrine as embodied in Article 6(3) of the Paris
Convention."

39 ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc. (ITC HI), 482 F.3d 135, 155 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128
S. Ct. 288 (2007); see also 5 McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 29: 1.

[A] trademark has a separate legal existence under each country's laws, and . .. its
proper lawful function is not necessarily to specify' the origin or manufacture of a
good (although it may incidentally do that), but rather to symbolize the domestic
goodwill of the domestic markholder so that the consumning public may rely with an
expectation of consistency on the domestic reputation earned for the mark by its
owner, and the owner of the mark may be confident that his goodwill and reputation
(the value of the mark) will not be injured through use of the mark by others in
domestic commerce.
Osawa, 589 F. Supp at 1171-72.
40 See ITC 11, 482 F.3d at 155; E. Remy Martin & Co., S.A. v. Shaw-Ross Int'l Imports,
Inc., 756 F.2d 1525, 1531 (11 th Cir. 1985) ("Our concern must be the business and goodwill
attached to United States trademarks, not French trademark rights under French law." (internal
quotation marks omitted)); cf Int'l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des
Estrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 359, 381 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that the owner of a foreign
mark can establish U.S. trademark rights through advertising in the United States coupled with
the rendering of services to American customers abroad).
41 ITC 1I, 482 F.3d at 156; see also Person's Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1569-70
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that use in Japan is not sufficient to establish priority rights in the
United States, even though the U.S. competitor took the mark in bad faith).
42
43

5 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 29: 1.

Paris Convention, supra note 8, art. 6(3); see also Person's Co., 900 F.2d at 1569
("[T]rademnark rights exist in each country solely according to that country's statutory
scheme."); Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 599 (5th
Cir. 1985).
44 See Int'l Caf6, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Caf6 Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 1279 (11 th
Cir. 2001) ("[T]he Paris Convention, as incorporated by the Lanham Act, is premised on the
idea that each nation's law should only have territorial application.").
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C. The Paris Convention, TRIPS, and the Famous Marks Doctrine
The Paris Convention, of which the United States is a signatory,
has over 110 adhering nations and is the primary international treaty
governing patents, trademarks, and unfair competition .4 ' The
principal purpose of the Paris Convention is to ensure that foreign
nationals receive the same treatment within the member countries
regarding patents, trademarks, and unfair competition that those
countries provide to their own citizens." The Paris Convention does
not create an international registry for trademarks, but adopts the
territoriality principle as a general rule and provides that "a mark
7
exists only under the laws of each sovereign nation."4
The famous marks doctrine originated in the addition of Article
6bis to the Paris Convention in 1925 as an exception to the general
rule of territoriality in establishing priority of use in a trademark.4
Under this exception, "a trademark or service mark is protected
within a nation if it is well known in that nation even though the mark
is not actually used or registered in that nation."4 9 The purpose of
Article 6bis "is to avoid the registration and use of a trademark, liable
to create confusion with another mark already well known in the
country of such registration or use, although the latter well-known
mark is not, or not yet, protected in that country by a registration
45

See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §29:25.

See id; G.H.C. BODENHAusEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 90 (1968).
46

47

5 MCCARTHY, supra note 1,§ 29:25.

48

Article 6bis of the Paris Convention provides that:

OF THE

PARIS

(1) The countries of the [Paris] Union undertake, ex officio if their legislation so
permits, or at the request of an interested party, to refuse or to cancel the registration,
and to prohibit the use, of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, an imitation,
or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by the competent
authority of the country of registration or use to be well known in that country as
being already the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of this Convention and
used for identical or similar goods. These provisions shall also apply when the
essential part of the mark constitutes a reproduction of any such well-known mark or
an imitation liable to create confusion therewith.
(2) A period of at least five years from the date of registration shall be allowed for
requesting the cancellation of such a mark. The countries of the Union may provide
for a period within which the prohibition of use must be requested.
(3) No time limit shall be fixed for requesting the cancellation or the prohibition of
the use of marks registered or used in bad faith.
Paris Convention, supra note 8, art. 6bis; see also ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc. (ITC fl), 482 F.3d
135, 156 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 288 (2007); 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §29:4.
49 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 29:61; see also Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat
Mkt., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 326-27 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. v.
DeBeers Diamond Syndicate, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 4099 (DLC), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9307, at
*21 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2005).
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which would normally prevent the registration or use of a conflicting
mark.",5 0 Article 6bis, however, does not provide any criteria for
determining what constitutes a famous mark . 5 '1Article 6bis merely
provides that the "competent authority" of the nation where protection
is sought shall decide whether a mark is "well known in that country
as being already the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of [the
Paris] Convention and used for identical or similar goods."5
In 1994, President Bill Clinton signed into law the Uruguay
Agreements Act to implement the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT").5 Title V of GATT relates to changes in intellectual
property law known as the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual

Property Rights (TRIPS). 54 Articles 16(2) and 16(3) of TRIPS,
like Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, recognize the famous
marks doctrine as an exception to the territoriality principle, but
these articles extend the reach of Article 6bis to famous marks on
non-competing goods.5 Of particular importance, TRIPS provides
that, when determining whether a mark is a famous mark, the
competent authority shall take account of "knowledge of the
trademark in the relevant sector of the public, including knowledge in
the Member concerned which has been obtained as a result of the
promotion of the trademark." 56 The Paris Convention, on the other
hand, only provides that the mark be famous in the country where the
mark holder seeks protection.5 Thus, under TRIPS, a foreign mark
owner need not prove that his mark is famous among the population
50BODENHAUSEN, supra note 46, at 90.
51 See Frederick W. Mostert, Well-Known and Famous Marks: Is Harmony Possible in the
Global Village?, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 103, 107 (1996).
52 Paris Convention, supra note 8, art. 6bis; see also 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §29:62.
53 See 5 MCCARrTHY, supra note 1, § 29:36 (noting that GATT is a multilateral treaty of
over one hundred nations aimed at reducing trade barriers and liberalizing world trade).
54 See TRIPS, supra note 8; 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 29:36.
55 Articles 16(2) and 16(3) of TRIPS provide:
[ 16(2)] Article 6bis of the Paris Convention (1967) shall apply, mulatis mutandis, to
services. In determining whether a trademark is well-known, Members shall take
account of the knowledge of the trademark in the relevant sector of the public,
including knowledge in the Member concerned which has been obtained as a result
of the promotion of the trademark.
[ 16(3)] Article 6bis of the Paris Convention (1967) shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to
goods or services which are not similar to those in respect of which a trademark is
registered, provided that use of that trademark in relation to those goods or services
would indicate a connection between those goods or services and the owner of the
registered trademark and provided that the interests of the owner of the registered
trademark are likely to be damaged by such use.
TRIPS, supra note 8, arts. 16(2), 16(3); see also 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §29:63.
56 TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 16(2) (emphasis added).
57 Paris Convention, supra note 8, art. 6bis.
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of an entire country, but only among the "relevant sector of the
public.""8
While TRIPS establishes where to seek evidence of famous mark
status, neither TRIPS nor Article 6bis of the Paris Convention provide
any factors for determining whether a mark qualifies as a famous
mark. 59 As such, different nations have developed different standards
for determining what constitutes a famous mark. 60In the United
States, courts that have recognized the famous marks doctrine under
federal law have developed different approaches for determining
whether a foreign mark falls under the famous marks exception. 61 But
as discussed below, federal courts are divided not only as to the
factors for determining whether a mark is a famous mark, but also as
to whether federal law actually recognizes a famous marks exception
to the territoriality doctrine.

11.

FAMOUS MARKS CASE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

A. State Common Law
Although the famous marks doctrine has existed since the
introduction of Article 6bis of the Paris Convention in 1925, there has
been very little case law addressing the doctrine in federal courts in
the United States until the past decade. Prior to this past decade, the
most notable cases dealing with the famous marks doctrine were trial
court decisions from New York in common law unfair competition
actions.6 In Maison Prunier v. Prunier's Restaurant & Cafe, Inc.,6 a
French corporation sought to enjoin the defendant's operation of a
restaurant in New York City that utilized the same name as the

58

Mostert, supra note 5 1, at 108.

59 See id
60

See 5 MCCARrHY, supra note 1, § 29:62; Alexis Weissberger, Note, Is Fame Alone

Sufficient to Create Priority Rights: An International Perspective on the Viability of the
FamousWell-Known Marks Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 739 (2006) (comparing
the treatment of the famous marks exception in the United States to its treatment in Brazil,
China, and South Africa).
61 Compare Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co. (Grupo fl), 391 F.3d 1088, 1098
(9th Cir. 2004) (finding that, in addition to determining that a mark satisfies the secondary
meaning test, a court must also be satisfied that "a substantial percentage of consumers in the
relevant American market is familiar with the foreign mark"), with Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V.
v. Dallo & Co. (Grupo 1), 119 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1091 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (finding that a mark
need only attain secondary meaning in the relevant sector of the public to qualify as a famous
mark for purposes of the famous marks exception), vacated, 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004).
62 See Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 193 N.Y.S.2d 332 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959); Maison
Prunier v. Prunier's Rest. & Cafe, Inc., 288 N.Y.S. 529 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1936).
63 288 N.Y.S. 529 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1936).
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plaintiff's restaurants in Paris and London. 6" In 1872, Alfred Prunier
65
founded a seafood restaurant in Paris under the name "Prunier.
Prunier later opened a second Prunier restaurant in Paris, and the
ownership and management of the two Paris restaurants passed down
through the family until 1922, when the plaintiff corporation bought
66
the restaurants. In 13,te
plaintiff established a branch Prunier
restaurant in London.6
The Prunier restaurants developed
68
international fame for their quality and wide variety of seafood.
Also in 1935, the defendants, without the permission of the French
plaintiff, opened a restaurant in New York named "Prunier' s
Restaurant and Cafe."6 In addition to taking the name of the famous
French restaurant, the defendants also adopted the French restaurant's
slogan, "Tout ce qui vient de law mer," 70 and advertised itself as "The
Famous French Sea Food Restaurant." 1 The defendants admitted that
they chose the name intentionally because of the good will and
reputation of the plaintiffs restaurants in Paris and London, but they
nonetheless argued that they never held themselves out as actually
being associated with the French Prunier's restaurants.7 The court
ultimately found for the plaintiff corporation, even though the French
corporation had never operated a restaurant in the United States.7
The court recognized the French plaintiffs right to sue in New
York under Article 1Obis of the Paris Convention, which requires
member states to "assure to the members of the Union an effective
protection against unfair competition.",7 4 The court also recognized
61
65

Id.at30-3 1.
Id. at 530.

66Id.
67 Id.
68 Idat530-3 1.
69 Id.

at 531.
See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc. (ITC If), 482 F.3d 135, 157 n.16 (2d Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 288 (2007) (providing the translation as "Everything that comes from the
sea").71 Maison Prunier,288 N.Y .S. at 53 1.
72 Id.
70

73

Id. at 538.

14

Id at 532. Article l0bis of the Paris Convention provides:

(1) The countries of the Union are bound to assure to nationals of such countries
effective protection against unfair competition.
(2) Any act of competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial
matters constitutes an act of unfair competition.
(3) The following in particular shall be prohibited:
1. all acts of such a nature as to create confusion by any means whatever with
the establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial activities, of a
competitor;
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the principle of territoriality, but found that an exception to the
territoriality principle exists where a second user is guilty of "bad
faith."7 In determining whether a second user is guilty of bad faith,
the court held that the mark's fame is a factor. 76 The French Prunier
restaurant was famous internationally, and it was entitled to
protection from "'any injury which might result to it from the
deception of the public through the unauthorized use of its trade
name, or a trade name which would lead the public to believe that it
77
was in some way connected with plaintiff."',
In 1959, a second New York trial court granted injunctive relief to
another famous Paris restaurant based on the fame of the restaurant's
mark in the United States.7 In Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc. , a New
York City restaurateur copied the name, decor, and descriptive script
style of the famous "Maxim's" restaurant in Paris. 80 The court found
for the plaintiff even though the New York restaurant was not in
direct competition with the Paris restaurant, concluding that the lack
of direct competition was immaterial to a common law unfair
competition claim.8 In determining whether the New York restaurant
had misappropriated the Maxim's mark, the court held that the French
restaurant owners had priority because of their uninterrupted use
of the mark in Paris and the fame of the Maxim's mark among "the
class of people residing in the cosmopolitan city of New York who

dine

out.",82

It is important to note, however, that although the holdings in both
of these cases recognize a famous marks exception to the territoriality
principle, they do not recognize this exception under Article 6bis of
the Paris Convention.8 Instead, the courts relied entirely on New

2. false allegations in the course of trade of such a nature as to discredit the
establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial activities, of a
competitor;
3. indications or allegations the use of which in the course of trade is liable to
mislead the public as to the nature, the manufacturing process, the
characteristics, the suitability for their purpose, or the quantity, of the goods.
Paris Convention, supra note 8, art. IlObis.
75 Maison Prunier,288 N.Y.S. at 535-36.
76 Id. at 537.
77 Id. at 534 (quoting Long's Hat Stores Corp. v. Long's Clothes, Inc., 231 N.Y.S. 107,
108 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928)).
78 See Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 193 N.Y.S.2d 332 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
79 193 N.Y.S.2d 332 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
90 Idat 334.
81Id
1at335.
82 Id. at 334.
83 See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc. (ITCH1), 482 F.3d 135, 157 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
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B. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
Two decisions of the federal Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
("TTAB") also provide examples of early recognition of the famous
marks exception. In Mother's Restaurants, Inc. v. Mother's Other
Kitchen, Inc. ,8 the TTAB found that advertising in the United States
of a mark used in Canada creates no priority rights in the mark for the
Canadian mark holder against a later good faith user in the United
States.8 But the court went on to state, in dictum, that if a plaintiff
can show that his mark was "famous" in the United States within the
meaning of Vaudable, then he will be able to preclude a later user of
the mark in the United States.8
In All England Lawn Tennis Club (Wimbledon), Ltd. v. Creations
Aromatiques, Inc.,89 the U.S. defendant sought to register a trademark
for "Wimbledon Cologne" with the USPTO. 9 0 The TTAB, under an
alternative holding, granted the plaintiff's request to block the
registration because the Wimbledon mark had "acquired fame and
notoriety as used in association with the annual championships within
the meaning of Vaudable." 9 ' The TTAB granted the injunction, even
though the plaintiff did not use the mark in the United States, because
"purchasers of applicant's cologne would incorrectly believe that said
product was approved by or otherwise associated with the Wimbledon
tennis championships and that allowance of the application would
damage opposer's rights to the mark." 92
But as with Maison Prunier and Vaudable, the TTAB's
recognition of the famous marks doctrine came not from the Lanham

128 S. Ct. 288 (2007).
94 See id
85 Decisions of the TI'AB are administrative decisions that are not binding on federal

district or circuit courts. 15 U.S.C. § 1071 (2006); Buti v. Impressa Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98,
105 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[Djecisions of the 17AB, while not binding on courts within this Circuit,
are nevertheless 'to be accorded great weight."' (quoting Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior
Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 1989))).
86 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1046 (T.T.A.B. 1983).
87 Id. at 1048.
88 Id
89 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1069 (T.T.A.B. 1983).

90 Id. at 1070.
91 Id at 1072.
92 Id.; see also First Niagara Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. First Niagara Fin. Group, Inc., 77
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 13 34 (T.T.A.B. 2005) (stating in dictum, that the owner of a famous foreign
mark need not use his mark in the United States to prevent the registration of the mark if it is
likely to promote confusion on the part of consumers).
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Act or Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, but from New York
common law principles of unfair competition.93 In Mother's
Restaurants, one member of the TTAB questioned the majority's
reliance on Vaudable and stated that federal application of the famous
marks doctrine "depends upon whether the applicable text of the Paris
Convention . .. and, in particular, Article 6bis of that Convention, is
self-executing." 94
C. The Ninth Circuit
In 2004, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals became the first
federal appeals court to directly address whether federal trademark
law recognizes the famous marks doctrine.95 In Grupo Gigante S.A.
de C. V v. Dallo & Co.,96 the plaintiff had operated grocery stores in
Mexico under the name "Gigante" since 1962." It registered the
"Gigante" trademark in 1963 with the Mexican government, and, as
of 1991, it operated almost one hundred "Gigante" grocery stores
throughout Mexico, including two next to the border with the United
States, near San Diego.98 Meanwhile, in 1991, Michael Dallo began
operating a grocery store in San Diego named "Gigante Market."99
Along with one of his brothers, he opened a second San Diego store
under the same name in 1996.100 In 1999, Grupo Gigante opened its
first U.S. store in the Los Angeles area, followed by two other
stores.' 0 ' Grupo Gigante called all three of its U.S. stores "Gigante,"
just like its Mexican stores.10 2 The Dallos sent Grupo Gigante a
cease-and-desist letter in July 1999, when they learned that the
Mexican company had opened a "Gigante" store in Los Angeles. 03
Grupo Gigante responded by filing a lawsuit in federal court for
trademark infringement under the Lanham Act.1

9 See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc. (ITC 1l), 482 F.3d 135, 159 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 288 (2007).
94 Mother's Rests, Inc. v. Mother's Other Kitchen, Inc.., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1046, 1051
(T.T.A.B. 1983).
9 See Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co. (Grupo II), 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir.
2004).
6 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004).
9 Id at 1091.
98 Id.
99 Id
100

01

Id

Id. at 1091-92.

I021d. at
103

M.
104~Id

1091.
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Under a strict interpretation of the territoriality principle, the
Dallos would prevail against Grupo Ggne105 The Dallos were the
first to make use of the "Gigante" mark in the United States, and, as
such, they had priority in the trademark in the United States. 106 The
district court, however, held that Grupo Gigante's "Gigante" chain of
grocery stores was sufficiently famous among Mexican-Americans in
Southern California to grant Grupo Gigante senior user status for the
mark in the United States. 107 The district court detennined that Grupo
Gigante's "Gigante" mark was famous in the United States because it
108
had acquired "secondary meaning" in Southern California.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the fundamental
principle in trademark law that "first in time equals first in right." 3 9 It
also recognized the territoriality principle as "'.basic to trademark
law." 1 10 Following the territoriality principle, Grupo Gigante's use of
the "Gigante" mark for decades prior to the Dallos' use of the mark is
rendered ineffectual, because Grupo Gigante's prior use of the mark
was in Mexico, not the United States." 1 But the Ninth Circuit found
that the territoriality principle is not absolute. 12 The court recognized
a famous marks exception to the principle of territoriality, stating that
"when foreign use of a mark achieves a certain level of fame for that
mark within the United States, the territoriality principle no longer
13
serves to deny priority to the earlier foreign user."
The Ninth Circuit, however, did not support its recognition of the
famous marks doctrine with specific language of the Lanham Act or
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, but rather with policy
justifications!1 14 According to the court:
An absolute territoriality
exception would promote
Commerce crosses borders.
do people. Trademark is, at
105

rule without a famous-mark
consumer confusion and fraud.
In this nation of immigrants, so
its core, about protecting against

e id.

107 Gnipo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dall & Co. (Grupo 1), 119 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1093
(C.D. Cal. 2000), vacated, 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004).
108Id at 1091 ("Secondary meaning refers to a mark's ability to identify particular goods
and services in the minds of consumers.").
109GrupoHI, 391 F.3d at 1093.
"Old (quoting Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591,
599 (5th Cir. 1985)).
1121d
4

See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc. (ITC HI), 482 F.3d 135, 160 (2d Cir. 2007) ("[lIt appears
that the Ninth Circuit recognized the famous marks doctrine as a matter of sound policy .
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 288 (2007).
1
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consumer confusion and "palming off." There can be no
justification for using trademark law to fool immnigrants into
thinking that they are buying from the store they liked back
home. "'
Since there was no support for its recognition of the famous marks
doctrine among federal circuit opinions, the court relied on Vaudable
and the TTAB's decisions in All England Lawn Tennis Club and
6
Mother's Restaurants.'"
The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion that
secondary meaning was sufficient to determine whether a foreign
mark qualifies as a "famous" foreign mark for purposes of the
exception to the territoriality principle. 1 7 Under the district court's
rule, a mark would have secondary meaning "'when, in the minds of
the public, the primary significance of a mark is to identify the source
of the product rather than the product itself.""'18 In analyzing the
district court's secondary meaning rule for defining a famous mark,
the Ninth Circuit stated that it "would go too far if [the court] did
away with the territoriality principle altogether by expanding the
famous-mark exception this much.""19 In addition to secondary
meaning, the Ninth Circuit held that, "where the mark has not
before been used in the American market, the court must be satisfied,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that a substantialpercentage of
consumers in the relevant American market is familiar with the
foreign mark."'120 The court went on to state that, in determining
whether a mark is a famous mark, a court should consider whether a
defendant intentionally copied the mark and whether unauthorized
domestic use of a famous foreign mark would likely confuse
2
consumers in the United States.'1 1
D. The Second Circuit
In 2007, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals became the second
federal circuit court to address the issue of whether there is a famous
marks exception to the territoriality principle in ITC Ltd v.
Punchgini, Inc.'122 But prior to the ruling in ITC, several district courts
1"5 Grupo HI,

391 F.3d at 1094 (footnote omitted).

1161d. at 1095.
7

11]d at 1097.
1181d at 1095 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 211
(2000)).
191d. at 1097.
120]d at 1098.
121Id.
122 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 288 (2007).
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within the Second Circuit had ruled on the availability of the famous
marks doctrine under federal trademark law, reaching varying
conclusions. In De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. v. DeBeers Diamond
Syndicate, Inc.,12 the foreign plaintiffs claimed to have trademark
rights to the "De Beers" mark in the United States for diamonds and
other luxury names.124 The plaintiffs sued the defendants for, inter
alia, trademark infringement under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
after the defendants had registered several Internet domain names
using the De Beers name and attempted to register the De Beers mark
with the USPTO. 12 ' The plaintiffs conceded that they had not sold
126
products or services under the De Beers name in the United States,
and sought to establish their priority rights to the De Beers mark
under the famous marks doctrine. 12 7 The defendants argued that since
the plaintiffs had not used the De Beers mark in commerce in the
United States, they did not have priority rights to the De Beers mark
128
in the United States under the territoriality principle.
The district court referred to the famous marks doctrine as
a "'controversial' common-law exception to the territoriality
principle,"129 but concluded that the owner of a famous foreign mark
could assert the doctrine under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act as a
'justified exception" to the territoriality principle. 130 The court noted
that "[rlecognition of the famous marks doctrine is particularly
desirable in a world where international travel is commonplace and
where the Internet and other media facilitate the rapid creation of
business goodwill that transcends borders."'13 ' Ultimately, however,
the court was cautious in its application of the famous marks doctrine
and found for the defendants because the foreign plaintiffs could not
132
prove substantial use in commerce.
Another district court reached a different conclusion about the
famous marks doctrine in Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat
Market, InC.' 33 In Almacenes, the plaintiff was a Colombian
123No. 04 Civ. 4099 (DLC), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9307 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2005).
1241Id.at *4 n.2. The plaintiffs traced their rights to the De Beers mark to the mining

company, founded in 1888, that originally made use of the De Beers mark. In the United States,
the De Beers name is associated with the advertising slogan. "A Diamond is Forever." Id. at *3.
125Id. at
26
1 Id. at
127Id.

*4.
*3.

at *18.

128

Id.at *19-20.

1291Id.at

*21 (quoting ITC Ltd. v. Pumchgini, Inc. (ITC 1), 373 F. Supp. 2d 275 (S.D.N.Y.

2005)).

130Id.

at *25.

131Id.
132Id. at
133381

*26.
F. Supp. 2d 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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corporation that owned and operated a large chain of supermarkets
throughout Colombia and Venezuela under the name EXITO . 3
Because of immigration, the EXITO mark was well-known among
certain segments of the Hispanic population in New York.'"5 The
defendants took advantage of the goodwill associated with the EXITO
mark by opening several small grocery stores in New York that used
36
the EXITO name and specialized in Latin American produce.1
Although the plaintiff had never used the EXITO mark in the
United States, it brought a trademark infringement claim against the
defendants pursuant to the Paris Convention's Article 6bis famous
marks exception to the territoriality principle.137 The district court
identified the territoriality principle as a "bedrock principle of federal
trademark law" 3 8 and concluded that recognition of the famous
marks doctrine would be "such a radical change in basic federal
trademark law" that only Congress, and not the courts, could
incorporate the doctrine into federal law.' 39 The judge acknowledged
that, "[tlo the extent the [famous marks] doctrine is a creature of
common law it may support state causes of action. "'40 But the judge
stated that the doctrine "has no place in federal law where
Congress has enacted a statute, the Lanham Act, that carefully
prescribes the bases for federal trademark claims."'14 ' In finding that
the famous marks doctrine is not part of federal trademark law, the
court rejected the plaintiff s claim that the Lanham Act recognizes the
doctrine by providing a foreign plaintiff with substantive rights under
Article 6bis.14 2 According to the court, the Lanham Act's
incorporation of the Paris Convention only requires "'.national
Before the Second Circuit's ruling in ITC, the court had
previously declined to address directly the famous marks doctrine in
two cases where the issue had arisen. First, in Buti v. Impressa
Perosa, S.R.L.,'"4 Impressa had opened a restaurant in 1988 under the
name "Fashion Cafe" in Milan, Italy, and had registered the Fashion
34

Id at 326.

1

135Id.
136

Id.

137Id

at 325.

138Id.

at 326.

39

1

1d at 328.

140M. at 327.
142Id
143Md. at 328 (quoting Int'l Cafd, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d
1274, 1278 (11 th Cir. 200 1)).
1-"139 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1998).
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Cafe mark with the relevant authority in Italy.145 Impressa had
advertised its restaurant in the United States, but it had never operated
any restaurants in the United States.'" Meanwhile, in 1993, Buti
opened a restaurant called Fashion Cafe in Miami, Florida, and then
later opened restaurants with the same name in New Orleans and New
York.14 7 Both Impressa and Buti attempted to register the Fashion
Cafe mark with the USPTO, and Buti filed an action in federal court
seeking recognition that Impressa had no rights to the Fashion Cafe
mark in the United States.148 The district court, and later the Second
Circuit, concluded that Impressa's efforts at advertising its restaurant
in the United States were insufficient to satisfy the use in commerce
standard, because the defendant only offered restaurant services in
Italy.149 In its opinion, the Second Circuit referenced the existence of
the famous marks exception, but concluded that the exception had no
application in the Buti case because Impressa had made no claim
under the doctrine." 0
The Second Circuit again referenced the famous marks doctrine in
Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., but declined to
address whether the doctrine provides a legal basis for establishing
priority rights in the United States.' 5 ' Empresa Cubana involved
Cubatabaco, a Cuban cigar manufacturer, which sought to prevent a
U.S. company, General Cigar, from selling cigars under the COHIBA
mark.15 2 Cubatabaco had sold cigars under the COHIBA mark in
Cuba since 1962 and internationally since 1982.s5 But because of the
1963 trade embargo on Cuban goods, Cubatabaco had never sold
COHIBA cigars in the United States.15 4 In 1981, General Cigar
registered the COHIBA mark with the USPTO and began selling
cigars in the United States under that mark. General Cigar stopped
selling COHIBA cigars in 1987, but it resumed selling them in
1992.'5
145
Id. at
146
Id.

100.

147 Id

148Id. at

100-01.

149Id. at 103; Buti v.

Impressa Perosa, S.R.L., 935 F. Supp. 458, 459-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1996),
affd, 139 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1998). But see Int'l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du
Cercle des Estrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 359, 381 (4th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the owner
of a foreign mark can acquire U.S. trademark rights merely through advertising in the United
States combined with rendering of services abroad to American customers).
1s0 Buti, 139 F.3d at 104 n.2.
1s'399 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 2005).
152Id. at 464"5.
153
Id. at 464.
154Id
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Cubatabaco argued that General Cigar had abandoned the
COHIBA mark in 1987 when it stopped selling cigars under the
COHIBA Mark.'516 Cubatabaco further argued that by 1992, when
General Cigar resumed selling COHIBA cigars, Cubatabaco's
COHIBA mark was sufficiently famous in the United States to
deserve protection under the famous marks doctrine. 517 The district
court recognized that the territoriality principle would normally
prevent Cubatabaco from succeeding, since General Cigar was the
first user of the COHIBA mark in the United States.'158 The court,
however, concluded that a claimant could pursue rights identified in
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention under section 44(b) of the
Lanham Act.'159 The court further concluded that the proper standard
for determining whether a mark is sufficiently famous to warrant
Article 6bis protection is whether the mark has acquired secondary
meaning for recognition.16 0 The district court ultimately found that
Cubatabaco's COHIBA mark was sufficiently famous in the United
States to warrant protection and held that Cubatabaco had priority in
6
the mark over General Cigar.'1 '
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, but declined to decide
whether it should recognize the famous marks doctrine because,
"6even assuming that the famous marks doctrine is otherwise viable
and applicable, the [Cuban] embargo bars [plaintiff] from acquiring
property rights in the. ...mark through the doctrine." 6 Cubatabaco
also asserted a claim for unfair competition under A-rticle 1Obis of the
Paris Convention, as incorporated by sections 44(b) and 44(h) of the
Lanham Act.'163 But the court held that the Paris Convention creates
no substantive rights beyond those independently provided for in the
Lanham Act. 164
In 2007, the Second Circuit directly addressed the availability of
the famous marks doctrine under federal trademark law in ITC Ltd. v.
Punchgini, Inc.'16 5 In ITC, the plaintiff, a corporation organized under
the laws of India, opened "Bukhara" restaurant in 1977 in a five-star

Id.

156

157Id.
158Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Cuibro Corp., No. 97 Civ. 8399 (RWS), 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4935, at *87 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2004), afd in par, rev'd in part, 399 F.3d 462 (2d Cir.
2005).
159Id.

at *89.

1601d. at *91.
161Id. at *152.
162Empresa Cubana, 399

1F.3d at 481.

163Id. at 484-85.

164Id
165 482

F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 1285S. Ct. 288 (2007).
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hotel in New Delhi, India.' 66 The restaurant has remained in
continuous operation for the past thirty years and has obtained a
measure of international renown. 16 7 ITC named the restaurant after
the legendary Silk Road city in Uzbekistan, and the restaurant
features a menu and d6cor inspired by the northwest region of
India.' 68 Over the past three decades, following the success of its New
Delhi restaurant, ITC opened or franchised Bukhara restaurants in
Hong Kong, Bangkok, Bahrain, Montreal, Bangladesh, Singapore,
Kathmandu, and Ajman.169 ITC also opened a Bukhara restaurant in
New York in 1986 and licensed the use of the "Bukhara" mark, which
it had registered with the USPTO in 1987, to a Chicago restaurateur
the same year.170 The New York Bukhara restaurant remained in
business for five years, closing its doors in 1991.'7' The Chicago
restaurant had a longer lifespan, but ITC cancelled the franchise in
1997, after a decade in business. 17 2
Later, in 1999, five individuals incorporated Punchgini, Inc. for the
purpose of opening an Indian restaurant in New York City.173 Three
of the five Punchgini incorporators had previously worked at ITC's
New Delhi Bukhara restaurant, and one of the five incorporators had
worked at ITC's New York Bukhara restaurant.174 In choosing a name
for its New York restaurant, Punchgini considered several different
possibilities, but ultimately decided on "Bukhara Grill."l 75
Punchgini's choice was due, at least in part, to the recognition of the
"Bukhara" mark among the relevant population in New York familiar
with ITC's New Delhi restaurant.176 In addition to the similarity in
names between ITC's "Bukhara" restaurant and Punchgini's
"Bukhara Grill" restaurant, Punchgini also replicated ITC's Bukhara
restaurant's logos, d6cor, staff uniforms, menus, and red-checkered
bibs.177 Punchgini's Bukhara Grill was successful, and some of the
original Punchgini incorporators organized a second corporation for

'Id. at 142-43.
167Id.; ITC Ltd. v. Punchgim, Inc. (ITC 11), 880 N.E.2d 852, 854 (N.Y. 2007) (stating that
the London-based "Restaurant" magazine named ITC's Bukhara restaurant as one of the fifty
best restaurants in the world), acq. in answer to certified question 518 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2008).
i6s ITC II, 482 F.3d at 143.
69Id

172Id

'7 Id. at 144.
174Id
176Id.

177Id
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the purpose of opening another New York restaurant, aptly named

"Bukhara Grill

11.,,178

In 2000, ITC demanded that Punchgini refrain from fur-ther use of
the "Bukhara" mark, accusing it of unlawfuilly appropriating the
reputation of ITC 's Bukhara restaurants in India and the United States
by adopting a virtually identical name for its Bukhara Grill
restaurants in New York. 179 Punchgini refused to stop using the
Bukhara mark, and ITC filed a lawsuit in federal court in 2003 for
trademark infringement.' 8 0 ITC's trademark infringement case faced a
significant hurdle in that ITC had not owned, operated, or licensed
any Bukhara restaurants in the United States since 1997. The district
court ruled that, because ITC had not used its Bukhara mark in
commerce in the United States for over three years, it had abandoned
the mark.'18 ' Therefore, in order for ITC to prevail, it had to argue that
U.S. trademark law precludes Punchgini's use of the Bukhara mark
because the mark is sufficiently famous among the relevant
population in New York that it will cause consumer
confuision-despite the fact that ITC had abandoned its own use of
the Bukhara mark in the United States before Punchgini opened its
82
first Bukhara Grill restaurant.1
On the issue of the famous marks doctrine, the district court stated
that "[tlhe very existence of this doctrine is controversial, as is its
scope."183 Nonetheless, the court reasoned that, assuming that the
doctrine is available under federal trademark law, ITC must at least
establish that the "Bukhara" mark had acquired secondary meaning in
the relevant American market to qualify under the famous marks
doctrine.'18 4 The court concluded that "[b]ecause ITC has failed even
to establish a triable issue as to the existence of 'secondary meaning'
in the New York market in which defendants operate, it is
unnecessary to decide whether to adopt the Ninth Circuit's analysis
requiring an additional showing over and above 'secondary
menn.,,185Thste district court did not address the existence of
the famous marks doctrine under federal law, but concluded that,
even if the doctrine was available, the plaintiffs mark was not

178

Id.

179Id

180Id.
I81

Id. at 153.

at 154.
Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc. (ITC 1), 373 F. Supp. 2d 275, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), afd,
518 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2008).
182Id.

183ITC

184Id.

at 288.
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sufficiently famous to warrant an exception to the territoriality
principle. 186
On appeal, the Second Circuit reiterated its conclusion in Empresa
Cubana that "the Paris Convention creates no substantive United
States rights beyond those independently provided in the Lanham
Act." 187 The court held that, because Congress had not expressly
incorporated the famous marks doctrine into the Lanham Act, it is not
part of federal trademark law. 188 The court acknowledged the many
policy justifications for recognizing a famous marks exception to the
territoriality principle, but concluded that sound policy "is not a
sufficient ground for its judicial recognition, particularly in an area
regulated by statute." 189 Therefore, the court concluded that Congress,
not the courts, is ultimately responsible for determining whether and
under what circumstances to make available an exception to the basic
principle of territoriality.
The Second Circuit expressly rejected ITC's argument that
sections 44(b) and (h) of the Lanham Act incorporate the protections
for famous marks provided in the Paris Convention and TRIPS. 190
According to the court, the plain language of sections 44(b) and (h)
do not indicate a clear congressional intent to incorporate a famous
marks exception into federal unfair competition law.191 The court held
that section 44(b) merely "grants foreign mark holders covered by
these treaties only those protections of United States law already
specified in the Lanham Act."' 92 As for section 44(h)'s references
to an "entitle[ment] to effective protection against unfair
competition,"' 93 the court concluded that its "precedent precludes [the
6

19 Id

1871TC 11, 482 F.3d at 162 (citing Empresa Cubans del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d
462,485 (2d Cit. 2005)).
18 Id. at 164.
189Id. at 165.
' 1 1d at 162-63. The court's finding that sections 44(b) and (h) do not incorporate the
famous marks protections of the Paris Convention and TRIPS is contrary to the view of a
leading commentator on trademark law. See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 29:4 ("In the
author's view, the well-known or famous marks doctrine of Paris Convention Article 6bis is
incorporated into United States domestic law through the operation of Lanham Act § 43(a),
§ 44(b) and § 44(h)." (footnote omitted)); see also Brandon Barker, Note, The Power of the
Well-Known Trademark: Courts Should Consider Article 6BIS of the Paris Convention an
IntegratedPart of Section 44 of the Lanham Act, 81 WASH. L. REv. 363 (2006).
191ITC 11, 482 F.3d at 163.
'921d. Section 44(b) requires that foreign mark holders receive "the benefits of this section
... to the extent necessary to give effect to any ...convention, treaty or reciprocal law," as well
as the "rights to which any owner of a mark is otherwise entitled by this chapter." 15 U.S.C. §
1126(b) (2006).
193 15 U.S.C. § 1126(h). Lanham Act § 44(h) provides, in fuill, that:
Any person designated in subsection (b) of this section as entitled to the benefits and
subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be entitled to effective protection
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court] from construing this phrase to afford foreign mark holders any
rights beyond those specified in section 44(b)." 9 The court reasoned
that Congress's "specificity in dealing with registered marks cautions
against reading a famous marks exception into sections 44(b) and (h),
which nowhere reference the doctrine, much less the circumstances
under which it would appropriately apply despite the fact that the
95
foreign mark was not used in this country."1
Despite the Second Circuit's holding that ITC could not maintain
a federal claim for unfair competition under the famous marks
doctrine, the court recognized that ITC might have a claim for
misappropriation under New York common law.' 96 As such, the court
certified to the New York Court of Appeals the question of whether
New York common law recognizes the famous marks doctrine.19 7 The
court also certified to the New York Court of Appeals the question of
how famous a mark must be to fall within the famous marks
doctrine.198 As to the second question, the Second Circuit listed four
possible standards that the state court might consider in establishing
whether a mark qualifies as a famous mark.'199
In December 2007, the New York Court of Appeals answered the
first question affirmatively, but stipulated that it was "not thereby
recognizing the famous or well-known marks doctrine, or any other
new theory of liability under the New York law of unfair
competition. 200 Instead, the state court held that "when a business,
through renown in New York, possesses goodwill constituting
property or a commercial advantage in this state, that goodwill is
protected from misappropriation under New York unfair competition
20
law . .. whether the business is domestic or foreign., '
As to the second certified question, the New York court stated that,
"at a minimum, consumers of the good or service provided under a
certain mark by a defendant in New York must primarily associate the

against unfair competition, and the remedies provided in this chapter for
infringement of marks shall be available so far as they may be appropriate in
repressing acts of unfair competition.
Id
I-ITC HI, 482 F.3d at 164.
1961d. at 165.

1971d at 166-67.
198Id. at 167.
1991d. at 167-70.
200ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc. (JTC 111), 880 N.E.2d 852, 859 (N.Y. 2007), acq. in answer
to certifiedquestion 518 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2008).
201Id
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mark with the foreign plaintiff. 20 2 The court declined to provide a list
of relevant factors for determining whether a plaintiffs mark had
established the requisite goodwill, but stated that this inquiry would
necessarily vary with the facts of each case.20 After receiving the
New York court's response, the Second Circuit affirmed its judgment
for the Punchgini defendants-concluding that ITC had failed "to
raise a triable question of fact on the issue of secondary meaning
necessary to establish a New York State claim for unfair competition
2
in a foreign mark., 04

Thus, the two federal circuit courts that have addressed the famous
marks doctrine directly have come to conflicting conclusions about
the doctrine's existence under federal trademark law. In the Ninth
Circuit's opinion in Grupo Gigante, the court relied almost entirely
on policy justifications for recognizing the doctrine as an exception to
an absolute rule of territoriality. 205 The Second Circuit concluded in
ITC that policy justifications cannot, by themselves, support finding
an exception to the bedrock principle of territoriality, especially
where Congress had enacted a comprehensive trademark statute.20
I11. INCORPORATING THE FAMOUS MARKs DOCTRINE INTO THE
LANHAM ACT

A. The Needfor a Famous Marks Exception to the Territoriality
Principle
Although the Second Circuit concluded in ITC that the Ninth
Circuit's reliance on policy justifications in Grupo Gigante could not,
by itself, support judicial recognition of the famous marks doctrine
under federal law,2 0 the Second Circuit did recognize the
persuasiveness of those policy arguments. 0 Globalization, the
Internet, increased immigration, the threat of trademark piracy, and
the United States' own treaty obligations all lend powerful support to
the argument that the United States should recognize, at the very
least, a limited famous marks exception to the territoriality

202

Id. at 860.

203Id
2

04ITC

Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 518 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2008).
(Grupo II), 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir.

203Gr'jpo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co.

2004).2

061TC Ltd. v. Punchgmni, Inc. (ITC fl), 482 F.3d 135, 164 (2d Cir. 2007), cer. denied, 128
S. Ct. 288 (2007).
207Id.
20

8Id. at

165.
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principle .209 Therefore, Congress should act to incorporate expressly
the protections for famous marks found in Article 6bis of the Paris
2 10
Convention and Article 16(2) of TIRIPS into the Lanham Act.
The primary policy underlying the law of trademarks is the interest
in protecting the public from confusion and deceit .2 1 '1 The Ninth
Circuit stated in Grupo Gigante that, in this nation of immigrants,
"[tlhere can be no justification for using trademark law to fool
immigrants into thinking that they are buying from the store they
liked back home." 2 Congressional recognition of the famous marks
exception would help protect immigrants from confusion and deceit.
Additionally, the Internet, satellite television, and increased
international air travel have all worked to create a smaller and more
networked world.2 1 Brand manufacturers can now promote their
products across borders in a much more efficient and cost-effective
manner than previously possible.2 1 Brand reputation for some brands
expands to foreign markets even before the brand owner has actually
begun marketing his products in those countries. 1 Unfortunately for
the owners of these international brands, trademark law has not kept
pace with the rapid expansion of globalization. 1 As a result,
trademark pirates are often able to register internationally famous
marks with their local trademark office before the true owner of the
mark even recognizes a need to protect its mark in that particular
country. 1
Trademarks, as intellectual property assets, are often the most
valuable assets global companies hold.21 In order to protect these
assets, it is essential that U.S. companies be able to enforce the
famous marks doctrine internationally. 2 19 The principle of comity
2

09See

James A. Carney, Setting Sights on Trademark Piracy: The Need for Greater

Protection Against Imitation of Foreign Trademarks, 81 TRADEMARK REP. 30 (1991)
(discussing the role that the famous foreign marks doctrine can play in combating trademark
piracy); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78
TRADEMARK REP. 267 (1988); Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of InternationalTrademark
Law, 2 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 1(1998) (discussing how globalization has created a need
for international hanmonization of trademark laws); Mostert, supra note 51, at 103-07
(discussing the various policy justifications for establishing clearer guidelines and a more
universal
approach to recognition of the famous marks doctrine).
210
See generally TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 16(2); Paris Convention, supra note 8, art. 6bis.
211See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §2: 1.
212
Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co. (Grupo 11), 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir.
2004).213
See Mostert, supranote 5 1, at 103-05.
214

See id. at 104.

215

Leaffer, supra note 209, at 4.
See Mostert, supra note 5 1, at 104-05.

2 6

1

217

218

See id at 105.
See id
id at 105-06 (discussing brand owners' need to protect their famous marks on a

219Cf
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among nations demands that the United States also honor its treaty
obligations under the Paris Convention and TRIPS and codify the
famous marks exception into federal trademark law .220 Furthermore,
recognition of the famous marks doctrine under federal law will
benefit U.S. consumers, because a strong trademark system enhances
competition .22 1 Absent adequate trademark protection within U.S.
courts, foreign companies will have little reason to provide quality
goods to U.S. consumers, because free riders would be able to destroy
their competitive advantage. 2
B. Possible Famous Marks Standards
Once Congress has determined that expressly incorporating the
famous marks doctrine into the Lanham Act best serves the
underlying policies of federal trademark law, it must then consider the
appropriate standard for determining when the doctrine should apply.
In ITC, the Second Circuit certified to the New York Court of
Appeals the question of how famous a foreign mark must be to permit
its owner to sue for unfair competition. 2 The Second Circuit then
suggested four possible standards that the New York Court of
Appeals might consider in answering the question: secondary
meaning, secondary meaning plus, the anti-dilution statute standard,
and the recommendation of the World Intellectual Property

Organization (",WIpo,). 224 Although the court suggested the
possibilities as standards for applying the famous marks doctrine
under New York common law, these four standards are also helpful
when considering the appropriate standard for application of the
famous marks doctrine under federal trademark law.
1. The Secondary Meaning Standard
Under the secondary meaning standard, a foreign mark would
qualify for federal trademark protection under the famous marks
doctrine if the mark had the ability to "trigger in consumers' minds a
link between a product or service and the source of that product or
service., 2 The U.S. District Court for the Central District of

global basis).
220

See id. at 106.

221Leaffer,

supra note 209, at 7.

222Id.
223ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc. (ITC fl), 482 F.3d 135, 167 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128
S. Ct. 288 (2007).
224
1d at 167-69.
225
Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co. (Grupo IH), 391 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir.
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California adopted this standard in Grupo Gigante to hold that the
correct inquiry was to decide whether the "Gigante" mark had
acquired secondary meaning in the San Diego area.22 In finding that
the Gigante mark had satisfied the secondary meaning standard and
therefore qualified for protection under the famous marks doctrine,
the district court considered seven independent factors.22 These
factors included: "survey evidence; direct consumer testimony;
exclusivity, manner and length of use of the mark; amount and
manner of advertising; amount of sales and number of customers;
established place in the market; and proof of intentional copying by

the defendant.

228

Secondary meaning serves two separate functions in trademark
law . 229 First, secondary meaning "serves to determine whether certain
marks are distinctive enough to warrant protection. 230 Therefore, in
Grupo Gigante, the foreign plaintiff would have to prove that
consumers identify the Gigante mark with the foreign plaintiffs
particular brand of store .23 ' The second function of the secondary
meaning standard is to define the geographic area in which a user has
priority, regardless of which user used the mark first.2 3 This second
fuinction of secondary meaning is an application of the Tea-Rectanus
doctrine. 3 Under this doctrine, priority of use of a mark in one area
of the United States does not necessarily prevent a good faith and
innocent user in another area of the United States from also using the
mark, if the second user's geographic area is "remote. 3 Because a
basic principle of trademark law is that trademark rights are governed
by priority of use,23 if a senior user has not used his mark in the

2004); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000) (stating
that a mark has secondary meaning "when, 'in the minds of the public, the primary significance
of a [mark] is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself" (quoting
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.1 1I(1982)) (alteration in original)).
226
Grupo Gigante S.A. de CV. v. Dallo & Co. (Grupo 1), 119 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1091
(C.D. Cal. 2000), vacated, 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004).
2211d.~; see also Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ'n, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143,
1151 (9th Cir. 1999) (listing the factors that a court should consider in determining whether a
has acquired secondary meaning).
descriptive
228 mark
Grupo 1, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 109 1.
2 29
Gruipo11, 391 F.3d at 1096.
23 d
231Id.
232Id
233

The doctrine' s name is derived from two early trademark cases: Hanover Star Milling

Co. v. Metcalf 240 U.S. 403 (1916) (the "Tea Rose" case); and United Drug Co. v. Theodore
Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
Rectanus
234
See 5 McCarthy, supra note 1, § 26:2.
235
Grupo Gigante S.A. de CN. v. Dallo & Co. (Grupo 1), 119 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1090
(C.D. Cal. 2000), vacated, 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004).
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junior user's territory, then the Tea-Rectanus doctrine holds that the
senior user may not prevent the junior user's use of the mark.2 3 The
result is that one user might have the right to use a mark in one
geographic area of the United States, while another user has the right
to use the same mark in another geographic area of the United
States.2 3
The Grupo Gigante district court acknowledged that, in adopting a
secondary meaning standard for famous foreign marks, it was
analyzing the case as if both the plaintiff and defendants were
operating stores in Southern California, as opposed to the actual
situation, where the plaintiff claimed its first priority status based on
its prior use of the Gigante mark in Mexico. 3 The plaintiff operated
a Gigante store in Tijuana, just twenty miles south of the defendants'
San Diego stores-as such, "[the court could find] no rational reason
why the outcome in this case should be different if the [plaintiff]
operated [its] Gigante grocery stores 20 miles to the north of the
defendants' stores, rather than 20 miles to the south."239 Thus, under
the district court's secondary meaning standard, it is completely
irrelevant that the foreign plaintiffs earlier use of the mark was
entirely outside the United States.2 4
But "treating international use differently is what the territoriality
principle does," as the Ninth Circuit correctly stated in Grupo
Gigante.2 4 If Congress were to adopt secondary meaning as the
appropriate standard, it would effectively abolish the territoriality
principle. 4 Under this standard, it would make no difference whether
prior use was made in the United States or abroad. 4 The only
relevant inquiry, under the Tea-Rectanus doctrine, would be whether
the mark had obtained secondary meaning within the "relevant sector
of the public",2 " to warrant protection. The Ninth Circuit concluded
that "[wje would go too far if we did away with the territoriality
236

Rectanus, 248 U.S. at 100.
Grupo HI,391 F.3d at 1096-97 ("The point of [the Tea-Rectanus] doctrine is that in the
remote area, where no one is liely to know of the earlier user, it is unlikely that consumers
would be confused by the second user's use of the mark.").
238
Grupo 1, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1091; see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 16:34
(noting that where plaintiff and defendant both use a descriptive mark, "the issue of priority and
ownership is not which party first used the mark, but which party first achieved secondary
meaning in the mark"); Investacorp, Inc. v. Arabian Inv. Banking Corp., 931 F.2d 1519, 1524
(11Ith Cir. 199 1) (holding plaintiff has no protectable interest in descriptive mark unless it
attained secondary meaning before defendant started using similar mark).
239
Grupo 1, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1092.
2
40See Grupo 1, 391 F.3d at 1097.
4
237

2 1Id.
242

See id

243Id

244

TRIPS, supranote 8, art. 16(2).
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principle altogether by expanding the famous-mark exception this
much." 4
Currently, there is no unified international trademark regime, and
trademark rights must be governed by each nation's individual
laws.2 4 The Paris Convention requires that member states maintain
adherence to the territoriality principle. 4 Because the territoriality
principle is such a long-standing principle of both domestic and
international law, Congress should not adopt secondary meaning as
the appropriate standard for determining whether a foreign mark
qualifies under the famous marks doctrine.
2. The Secondary Meaning Plus Standard
The second possible standard that the Second Circuit suggested in

ITC was what it referred to as "secondary meaning

plus." 2 48

Secondary meaning plus is the compromise standard that the Ninth
Circuit ultimately concluded was the appropriate standard in Grupo
249
Gigante. Under this standard, a court would first determine whether
the mark had acquired secondary meaning under the test that the
district court applied in Grupo Gigante. 2 ' 0 Then, "Where the mark has
not before been used in the American market,2 5 the court must be
satisfied, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a substantial
percentage of consumers in the relevant American market is familiar
with the foreign mark.",25 2 Judge Graber, in a concurring opinion in
Grupo II, suggested that, under this standard, a "'substantial'
percentage" of people in the relevant market would mean more than

245

Grupo 11,391 F.3d at 1097.

2461d at 1098; see Ingenohi v. Olsen & Co., 273 U.S. 541, 544 (1927) ("A trade-mark

started elsewhere would depend for its protection in Hongkong upon the law prevailing in
Hongkong and would confer no rights except by the consent of that law."); Fuji Photo Film Co.
v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 599 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[T]rademark rights
each country solely according to that country's statutory scheme.").
exist in
247
Paris Convention, supra note 8, art. 6(3) ("A mark duly registered in a country of the
Union shall be regarded as independent of marks registered in the other countries of the Union,
including the country of origin.").
4
2 8ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc. (ITC fl), 482 F.3d 135, 167 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128
S. Ct. 288 (2007).
2 49
GupoII1,391 F.3d at 1098.
250 Id.
251Under the facts of the ITC case, Congress would need to provide that secondary
meaning plus also applies where the holder of a famous mark had previously used the mark in
the United States, but had since abandoned domestic use of the mark. See ITC 11, 482 F.3d at
167 n.3 1.
252Grupo 11, 391 F.3d at 1098 (footnote added).
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fifty percent. 5 This is also the standard suggested by J. Thomas
254
McCarthy, the author of the leading treatise on trademark law.
In Grupo Gigante, the Ninth Circuit defined the "relevant
American market" as the "geographic area where the defendant uses
the alleged infinging mark."2 55 The court also provided two relevant,
though "not necessarily determinative," factors that a court should
consider in determining whether a foreign mark satisfies the
secondary meaning plus test: "the intentional copying of the mark by
the defendant, and whether customers of the American firm are likely
to think they are patronizing the same firm that uses the mark in
another country." 25 6 As Judge Graber emphasized in her concurrence
in Grupo Gigante, secondary meaning plus is an intermediate
standard between secondary meaning and the Lanham Act's
anti-dilution statute.25 Under this secondary meaning plus standard,
the owner of a foreign mark need not satisfy the higher degree of
fame required by the anti-dilution statute. 5 But where the owner
does not use the mark in the United States, "[the foreign mark owner]
must show more than the level of recognition that is necessary in a
domestic trademark infringement case." 5
3. The Anti-Dilution Statute Standard
The standard provided under section 43(c) of the Lanham Act, the
federal anti-dilution statute, 260 was thh third possible standard
suggested by the Second Circuit in ITC.26 1 The anti-dilution standard
25

Id. at 1108 (Graber, J., concurring).
See 5 MCCARTHY, supranote 1, § 29:4 (agreeing with the Ninth Circuit that substantial
percentage is a reasonable rule and that "at least 50% of the relevant group is an appropriate
measure of 'substantial' in this context").
255Grupo 11, 391 F.3d at 1098.
254

Id.

256

2571d. at 1107 (Graber, J., concurring); see 15 U.S.C.
258
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
259

§ 1125(c) (2006).

Grupo 11, 391 F.3d at 1106 (Graber, J., concurring).

§43(c)(1)

260

of the Lanham Act reads as follows:

(c) Dilution by blurring; dilution by tarnishment.
(1) Injunctive relief.
Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark that is
distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to
an injunction against another person who, at any time after the owner's mark
has become famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that
is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous
mark, regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of
competition, or of actual economic injury.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
261 ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc. (ITC IH), 482 F.3d 135, 168 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128
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is a much higher standard than secondary meaning in that it requires
that a mark be "widely recognized by the general consuming public of
the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services
of the mark's owner." 262 The holder of a mark that satisfies this high
standard may seek to enjoin another person who uses the mark,
"regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion,
of competition, or of actual economic injury. 6 Thus, a mark that
meets this high standard receives nationwide protection.
Section 43(c)(2)(A) provides four factors for a court to consider
when determining whether a mark is sufficiently famous for
anti-dilution protection:
(i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising
and publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized
by the owner or third parties.
(ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of
goods or services offered under the mark.
(iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark.
(iv) Whether the mark was registered under the Act of March
3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal
264
register.
These factors provide useful guidelines that a court might consider
in determining whether a mark is sufficiently famous to warrant
protection under the foreign marks doctrine.
But the anti-dilution standard, especially the requirement that the
mark be "widely recognized by the general consuming public of the
United States,", 265 is much too high a standard to apply in the famous
marks doctrine context. In Grupo Gigante, the Ninth Circuit argued
that courts should not allow unscrupulous entrepreneurs to use
trademark law to "fool immigrants into thinking that they are buying
from the store they liked back home." 266 If Congress were to choose
to apply the anti-dilution standard to the famous marks doctrine, the
doctrine would not serve to protect immigrants in the vast majority of

S. Ct. 288 (2007).
26215 U.S.C.
263M.
264

M.

§ I 125(c)(2)(A).
§ 1125(c)(1).
§ 1125(c)(2)(A).

265Id

266

2004).

Grupo Gigante S.A. de CNl. v. Dallo & Co. (Grupo HI), 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir.
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cases. Applied to the facts of the Grupo Gigante case, the foreign
plaintiff would need to prove that a significant percentage of all
Americans across the nation recognized the Gigante mark as the
plaintiff s mark.26 But the benefit the Grupo Gigante defendants
received by adopting the Gigante mark was not the goodwill the mark
carried nationwide, it was the goodwill the mark carried among the
Hispanic population in Southern California. 6 Thus, adopting the
anti-dilution standard for purposes of determining whether a mark
would fall under the famous marks doctrine would be equivalent to
refusing to recognize the doctrine altogether.
4. The WIPO Standard
Finally, the Second Circuit suggested in ITC that, should the New
York Court of Appeals decide to adopt a completely new standard for
the recognition of the famous marks doctrine, it might consider the
factors recommended by the WIPO in 1999 in the non-binding Joint
Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of

Well-Known Marks. 269 These factors include:
1. the degree of knowledge or recognition of the mark in the
relevant sector of the public;
2. the duration, extent and geographical area of any use of the
mark;
3. the duration, extent and geographical area of any
promotion of the mark, including advertising or publicity and
the presentation, at fairs or exhibitions, of the goods and/or
services to which the mark applies;
4. the duration and geographical area of any registrations,
and/or any applications for registration, of the mark, to the
extent that they reflect use or recognition of the mark;
5. the record of successful enforcement of rights in the mark,
in particular, the extent to which the mark was recognized as
well known by competent authorities;

267

268

See generally Grupo 1I, 391 F.3d 1088.
1d. at 1091.

269 WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., JOINT RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING
PROVISIONS ON THE PROTECTION OF WELL-KNOW MARKS (Sept. 1999), http://www.wipo.inI!

exportlsites/wwAw/about-ip/enldevelopmentiplaw/pdf/pub833.pdf [hereinafter WIPO REPORT].
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6. the value associated with the mark.2 7
The New York Court of Appeals ultimately answered the Second
Circuit's second certified question by stating that, under New York
common law, "[w]hether consumers of a defendant's goods or
services primarily associate such goods or services with those
provided by a foreign plaintiff is an inquiry that will, of necessity,
vary with the facts of each case." 7 In so doing, the court refused to
provide an "exhaustive list of the factors relevant to such an
inquiry. 2 72 The court's conclusion correctly states the reality of
litigation under the famous marks doctrine. The determination of
whether a mark is sufficiently famous to warrant an exception to the

territoriality principle is a question of fact.273 The foreign marks that
might qualify for this exception will vary immensely depending on
the product or services sold under the mark and the geographic area
encompassed by the "relevant sector of the public." 274 As such,
determinations of whether a mark is sufficiently famous to fall under
the famous marks doctrine will necessarily have to be a case-by-case
inquiry. 7
C The AppropriateFamous Marks Standard
Adoption of a variation of the Ninth Circuit's secondary meaning
plus standard will best address the needs for a famous marks
exception to the territoriality principle in an increasingly global
economy, the interests in maintaining adherence to the long-standing
trademark principle of territoriality, and the practical necessity for a
flexible standard to determine whether a mark is sufficiently famous
on a case-by-case basis. Under this standard, a foreign mark will be
sufficiently famous to warrant protection under federal trademark law
if a substantial percentage of the relevant sector of the public is
familiar with the mark, such that the defendant's use will likely cause
confusion within that sector of the public. 7 In applying this standard,

courts should consider the factors recommended by the

WIPO, 277

as

7

2 0Id at 6; see also Mostert, supra note 5 1, at 1I1- 13 (listing the factors that are common

among the Lanham Act's anti-dilution statute, the Cartagena Agreement, The Canadian
Trade-marks Act, cases in Colombia, France, and Mexico, practice procedures of the Trade
Mark Office in China, and the WII'O report).
271ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc. (ITC 111), 880 N.E.2d 852, 860 (N.Y. 2007), affd, 518 F.3d
159 (2d Cir. 2008).
272 Id.
273
See Mostert, supra note 5 1, at 113.
274SeTRIPS, supra note 8, art. 16(2); Mostert, supra note 5 1, at 113.
275SeMostert, supra note 5 1, at 113.
276Se5 McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 29:4.
277 SeWIPO REPORT, supra note 272, at 6.
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well as any other factors that the particular circumstances of a given
case call into question. The facts of each case will dictate which
factors are relevant. 7
Two issues that will prove extremely important in analyzing any
famous marks doctrine case under this secondary meaning plus
standard will be determining what constitutes a "substantial
279
percentage" and who constitutes the "relevant sector of the public."
As to the former issue, the practical need for flexibility in applying
the secondary meaning plus standard mandates that a court not define
"substantial percentage" as any specific threshold number. 280
Evidence to prove that a substantial percentage of the public is
familiar with a particular mark might include "unsolicited requests
from potential licensees, distributors and consumers of the goods or
services which bear the mark .... [and] survey evidence.",2 8 ' Because
the types of evidence that a plaintiff might introduce to establish the
fame of his mark could vary so drastically, any attempts by a court to
establish a minimum percentage that constitutes "substantial
percentage" will likely prove futile.2 8 Further, courts should be
hesitant to attach too much weight to survey evidence that purports to
establish that a certain percentage of the relevant sector of the public
is familiar with a particular mark, as that evidence might not be
comprehensive or entirely accurate.
On a case-by-case basis, the issue that will most likely prove
determinative under the secondary meaning plus standard will be
defining who constitutes the "relevant sector of the public." In Grupo
Gigante, Judge Graber stated in her concurrence that:
Because a conclusion that Plaintiffs have a protectable
interest would prohibit Defendants from selling groceries
under that mark to any residents of San Diego County-not
just to Mexican-Americans-it makes little sense to define
the relevant public so narrowly. Comprised of all grocery
shoppers, the "relevant sector of the public" in this case is the
very antithesis of a specialized market; because everyone

279See
279

2

Mostert, supra note 5 1, at 114.

See 5 MCCARTHY, supranote 1, §29:4.

80But see Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. Dallo & Co. (Grupo II), 391 F.3d 1088, 1108
(9th Cir. 2004) (Graber, J., concurring); 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 29:4 (suggesting that at
least 50 percent of the relevant group is an appropriate measure of a "substantial percentage").
281Mostert, supra note 5 1, at I111.
2
82Id.
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eats, the relevant sector of the public consists of all residents
of San Diego County, without qualification. 8
Thus, under Judge Graber's analysis of what constitutes the relevant
sector of the public, Grupo Gigante would have to prove that a
substantial percentage of the entire population of San Diego County
was familiar with the plaintiffs Gigante mark.2 8 Defining the
relevant sector of the public so broadly would render the famous
marks doctrine ineffective in many of the cases where its application
would be most desirable. If the famous marks doctrine is to mean
anything to the plaintiff in Grupo Gigante, the court must define the
relevant sector of the public to include only the people who a
defendant seeks to confuse and deceive. 8 Under the facts of Grupo
Gigante, a fairer definition of the relevant sector of the public would
be only those Mexican-Americans in San Diego who shopped at the
defendants' Gigante stores.28
But determining the appropriate standard for who constitutes the
relevant sector of the public would also greatly depend on the facts of
a given case. The WIPO, in its Joint Recommendation
Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks,
provided several factors for determining who constitutes the relevant
sector of the public:
(a) Relevant sectors of the public shall include, but shall not
necessarily be limited to:
(i) actual and/or potential consumers of the type of goods
and/or services to which the mark applies;
(ii) persons involved in channels of distribution of the
type of goods and/or services to which the mark applies;
(iii) business circles dealing with the type of goods and/or
services to which the mark applies.
(b) Where a mark is determined to be well known in at least
one relevant sector of the public in a Member State, the mark
shall be considered by the Member State to be a well-known
mark.
283 Grupo 11,
254

285

391 F.3d at 1108 (Graber, J., concurrng).

Id.

See I McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:1 (stating that the primary policy underlying the
law of286
trademarks is the interest in protecting the public from confusion and deceit).
Grupo 11, 391 F.3d 1088.
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(c) Where a mark is determined to be known in at least one
relevant sector of the public in a Member State, the mark may
be considered by the Member State to be a well-known mark.
(d) A Member State may determine that a mark is a
well-known mark, even if the mark is not well known or, if
the Member States applies subparagraph (c), known, in any
relevant sector of the public of the Member State.2 8
For example, in Person's Co. v. Christmnan,8 the plaintiff was a
Japanese clothes manufacturer who produced and sold clothes under
the "Person's" brand.2 8 It did not sell "Person's" clothes in the
United States and had not registered the mark with the USPTO, and
the "Person's" mark was not known in the United States .290 The
defendant, while on a trip to Japan, discovered the plaintiffs line of
clothes and decided to develop his own line of "Person's" clothes to
sell in the United States, without the plaintiffs permission .29 ' When
the plaintiff learned of the defendant's activities, he sued the
defendant based on likelihood of confusion, but the court held that the
plaintiff's prior use in Japan did not warrant him protection in the
United States.2 9
While commentators have criticized the Person's Co. court's
ta
293
it is clear tathe plaintiffs mark was not famous in
holding,
the United States when the defendant first made use of the mark in
the United States. Therefore, the famous marks doctrine should not
apply in that situation. But under a narrow definition of who
constitutes the relevant sector of the public, such a plaintiff could
argue that a court should only consider whether a substantial
percentage of Japanese-Americans are familiar with the mark. Yet the
defendant in Person 's did not appropriate the plaintiffs mark because
he wanted to appropriate the goodwill associated with the mark in the
United States 2 9 -the mark was not known outside of Japan, so there
was no goodwill associated with the mark in the United States.29
As this example shows, in applying the secondary meaning plus
standard, it is important that courts focus on "the overall 'commercial
287 WIPO

REPORT, supra note 272, at 7.
F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir 1990).
289MIdat 1566"7.
2
90Id
285900

291

Id

292Id.

at 1569-70.
e.g., Carney, supra note 209, at 3 1.
e Person's,900 F.2d at 1570.

293See,
29

295Id
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impression' and the picture that emerges from the totality of
the evidence. 9 Adoption of the Ninth Circuit's secondary meaning
plus standard would allow courts the flexibility they need to
analyze whether a mark is sufficiently famous for protection on a
case-by-case basis.
CONCLUSION

The Paris Convention and TRIPS both provide that signatory
nations recognize a famous marks exception to the fundamental
trademark principle of territoriality. 9 The United States is a
signatory of both of these international treaties. But TRIPS is not
self-executing on its face,2 9 and a majority of U.S. courts have held
that the Paris Convention is not self-executing. 2 99 As such, if federal
trademark law provides for a famous marks exception to the
territoriality principle, it must do so under the Lanham Act-the
comprehensive and frequently amended statute that represents the
codification of federal trademark law. But the Lanham Act does not
expressly provide for the famous marks doctrine . 300 Therefore, it is up
to Congress, not the federal judiciary, to incorporate the famous
marks doctrine into federal trademark law.
Cases such as ITC and Grupo Gigante provide convincing
evidence that Congress must act to incorporate the substantive
provisions of the Paris Convention and TRIPS into the Lanham
Act. 30 ' The primary policy of trademark law is to protect the public

from confusion and

deceit. 302

The famous marks doctrine will prevent

the behaviors that the defendants in ITC and Grupo Gigante
exhibited-taking advantage of the goodwill of a famous foreign
mark to confuse customers into thinking that they were associated
with the foreign mark holder.
A secondary policy of trademark law is to protect the trademark
owner's interest in his mark.30 Globalization has increased the value
of famous marks as intellectual property assets, but it has also created
296

Mostert, supra note 5 1, at 114.
See TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 16(2); Paris Convention, supra note 8, art. 6bis.
See 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1) (2000) ("No provision of any of the Uruguay Round
Agreements [including TRIPs], nor the application of any such provision to any person or
circumstance,
that is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect.").
2
99See, e.g., Int'l Caf6, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Cafd Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 1277
n.5 (11Ith
Cir. 2001).
3
00See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc. (ITC 11), 482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007), cer. denied, 128
S. Ct. 288 (2007).
301See id.; Grupo Gigante S.A. de CAR. v. Dallo & Co. (Grupo fl), 391 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir.
2004).302
See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §2: 1.
297

298
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more opportunities for trademark piracy. 304 The incorporation of the
famous marks doctrine into federal law will help ensure the owners of
famous foreign marks that their marks are safe from misappropriation
in the United States. Finally, if Congress does not act to incorporate
the famous marks doctrine into the Lanham Act, then the United
States will remain in violation of its treaty obligations under the Paris
Convention and TRIPS. This could lead to problems of reciprocity
when U.S. companies attempt to ensure the protection of their famous
marks abroad.30
Congress should incorporate the substantive provisions of Article
6bis of the Paris Convention and Article 16(2) of TRIPS into the
Lanham Act. The appropriate standard for determining whether a
foreign mark warrants protection as a famous foreign mark should be
the Ninth Circuit's secondary meaning plus standard. 0
The
secondary meaning plus standard will best balance the need to
prevent consumer confusion and ensure compliance with international
treaty obligations that incorporate the territoriality principle.
Moreover, the secondary meaning plus standard will allow courts the
flexibility to apply the famous marks doctrine in what will necessarily
be a fact-specific, case-by-case determination.
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